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COMMENTS
OGDEN v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL BANK.*
In this case one B had on deposit in defendant bank subject to
check, $500. B made arrangements to go to a hospital for a
serious surgical operation. Desiring to give to her mother, W,
the money above mentioned in case of her death, but apparently
immediately, B went to the bank in company with W, just before
the operation, told the cashier and the bookkeeper of her desire
and they marked her account, "In case of death W to check."
The operation occurred and B died three days later. W, then,
went to the defendant, drew a check for $500, and that amount
was placed to her credit and later checked out by her. Plaintiff
was B's administrator, and sued defendant to recover the amount
of the deposit, although he had in his hands sufficient assets to
pay all claims against the estate.
Was plaintiff entitled to recover, or did defendant rightfully
pay the money to W? Did the operative facts create any legal
capacities in W and any correlative legal liabilities in the defend-
ant bank? In order to give a correct answer to this question it
will be necessary to consider it from the standpoint at least of
gifts, bailments, powers of attorney, assignments, declarations
of trust, and contracts.
Did the facts create a gift? The trial court of Daviess County
held that they did, and the Appellate Court of Indiana held that
they created a gift inter vivos.1 Were these courts right? The
earlier Indiana decisions2 and the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions 3 do not seem to have gone so far as the decision in
the instant case( but there is some authority in other jurisdic-
tions to support it. 4 The difficulty concerns delivery. Delivery
* Ogden v. Washington National Bank, (1924) 82 Indiana Appeals 187,
145 N. E. 514.
1 The Appellate Court did not explain why it regarded the gift as a gift
inter vivos rather than as a gift causa mortis. For this reason and for
other reasons which will appear perhaps no comment should be made on
whether or not the court was right on this point, but it is hard to see how,
if there was a gift at all, it was not a gift causa mortis for clearly it was
made "in view of death then imminent". Basket v. Hassell, (1882) 107 U.
S. 602; Caylor v. Caylor s Estate, (1899) 22 Ind. App. 666; Brunson et ux.
v. Henry et al., (1894) 140 Ind. 455.
2 Devol et al v. Dye et al, (1889) 123 Ind. 321; Gammon Theo. Ser. v.
Robbins, (1891) 128 Ind. 85; Martin v. McCullough, 136 Ind. 331 (1893);
Smith v. Moore, (1922) 77 Ind. App. 455; Ross v. Watkins, (1923) 80 Ind.
App. 487.
3 Cockrane v. Moore, (1890) L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 57.
4 Castle v. Persons, (1902) 117 Fed. 835; 54 C. C. A. 133; Ebel v Piehl,
(1903) 134 Mich. 64; Dinslage v. Stratman, (1920) 105 Neb. 274.
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is the chief requisite of a gift. It is very difficult to find any
delivery in this case. All that B undertook to give W was a debt
due her by the bank. There was no physical thing belonging to
B in the possession of the bank which was capable of delivery
as the object of the gift or as evidence thereof and B gave W
nothing as evidence of the gift. Hence there was nothing deliv-
ered by anybody, either actually or symbolically, to perfect the
gift, and therefore there was no gift in the sense in which that
term has generally been used in Anglo-American law. Anglo-
American law has gradually relaxed the requirement of deliv-
ery for gifts so as to permit symbolical delivery, not only where
there is actual delivery of a corporeal chattel as evidence of an
incorporeal chattel, but also where the donee is already in pos-
session5 and where there is a forgiveness of debts,0 on the theory
that there has been all of the delivery of which the subject-mat-
ter is capable. But when there is nothing of which any delivery,
either actual or symbolical, can be made, is the requirement to
be dispensed with? Suppose we admit that on the facts some
legal right should be held to be created should it not be found in
some other branch of the law than gifts? If the court in the
instant case was of the opinion that the plaintiff should not re-
cover because W was the owner of the money should it not have
placed its decision on some other ground? To hold that there
was a gift under such circumstances not only destroys the law
of gifts as it has been developed in Anglo-American law, but it
makes that a gift which more nearly resembles a number of
other legal transactions. If there were no other theory on which
the case could have been decided perhaps the court was justified
in further relaxing or stretching the law of gifts, but the case
might have been decided upon other theories.
Did the facts create a bailment in favor of W? There could be
no such bailment, because Tor a bailment the law requires the
rightful possession of goods by some one not the owner.7 The
bank had no goods of B and was not a bailee of B, and therefore
could not by attornment become a bailee of W.
Did the facts give W a power of attorney to collect the debt
and keep the proceeds thereafter as a gift? Unquestionably W
had this power before B's death.$ Did she have this power after
B's death? Powers should be classified (1) as the powers of an
agent, which are for the benefit of the principal and which are
5 Tenbrook v. Brown, (1861) 17 Ind. 410; Teague v. Abbott, (1912) 51
Ind. App. 604.
U Gray v. Barton, (1873) 55 N. Y. 68.
7 Williston on Contracts, § 1032.
s 31 Yale L. J. 283.
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held and should be held to terminate with the death of the prin-
cipal, at least after notice ;9 and (2) proprietary powers, which
are for the benefit of the holder-an alter ego not responding
to the will of the creator-and which should be held not to ter-
minate with the death of the creator, and which the English
cases and many United States cases would hold are not termi-
nated even though there is no assignment nor change of posses-
sion of document. 10 However the great weight of authority in
the United States, probably due to Marshall's opinion in the case
of Hunt v. Rousmaniere," is to the effect that proprietary pow-
ers, like the powers of an agent, are terminated by death unless
coupled with an interest, which term is given a connotation nar-
rower than proprietary. 12 According to the weight of authority
the power of attorney of W was terminated by B's death, but
upon principle it should not have been, and the Appellate Court
might well have so held. Marshall's concepts in Hunt v. Rous-
maniere were mediaeval. The authorities cited represent out-
grown English law. Hunt v. Rousmaniere was but a bit of for-
malism. It has been severely criticised. By repudiating it the
Appellate Court of Indiana would not have done violence to the
law of gifts but would have repudiated an outgrown theory of
powers and established the law of proprietary powers on the
new basis on which they should be placed.
Did the facts create a trust? The difficulty with this -sort of
an explanation is that unless and until the bank had the money
set aside there was no trust property. 13 B was not a trustee,
because such was not the intent. If B had collected the money
before her death and had been compelled by the court to pay over
the proceeds to W, it would not have been on the theory of a
trust, but because B would have violated her duty to keep her
hands off from a donee beneficiary contract. 14
Did the facts create an assignment? The Appellate Court
seems to have rested its decision partly on this ground. But
the objections to classifying the transaction as a gift are equally
fatal to classifying it as an assignment. In order to have an
assignment either a contract or a gift is necessary.15 For an
9 Mechem on Agency, §§ 652-675; Adams v. Merced Stone Co. (1917) 176
Cal. 415.
10 31 Yale L. J. 298.
11 (1828) 8 Wheat. 174.
12 31 Yale L. J. 283; Glennon v. Rochester Tr. and S. Co., (1913) 209 N.
Y. 12; Farmers Loan and T. Co. v. Wilson, (1893) 139 N. Y. 284.
13 Steel v. Clark, (1875) 77 Ill. 471.
14 Clark on Equity, § 258, note 9.
15 Williston on Contracts, § 430, § 440.
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irrevocable gift either delivery or a deed is necessary. 16 For a
contract either consideration or a seal is necessary. 17 None of
these facts operated in this case. An assignment without one
of these facts would create only a power, the effect of which
we have already considered.' 8
Did the facts create a contract? There are two possible con-
tract theories according to which a contract obligation could
be found.
As between B and W there was neither agreement, nor con-
sideration, nor seal, but there was an oral promise which was
intended to be binding. It has been contended that such a
promise is all that should be required for a contract ;19 and the
Indiana Supreme Court, in the case of Dawkins v. Sappington,20
has so held where there is an offer of reward. Either the case
of Dawkins v. Sappington was wrongly decided and should be
overruled or the doctrine of that case should be extended to all
offers, but the court in the instant case did neither. At the
time of the decision, of course there was no thought of extending
the doctrine, for the Indiana Supreme Court simply followed
the earlier English case of Williams v. Carwrdine,21 which
clearly misapplied the law-evidently out of a mistaken analogy
to contracts under seal-and which has been repudiated by the
weight of authority in the United States.2 2 It may well be urged
that a promise in writing, signed and delivered, should be
enough to create a contract on the theory that signature is a
sufficient substitute for the obsolete requirement of the seal, but
it probably would be unwise to give such effect to a mere oral
promise.23
As between B and the bank it might be held that there was
a contract based upon consideration and agreement, made upon
the opening of B's account, according to which the bank prom-
ised B that it would pay whomever B designated either by draw-
ing a check or otherwise, 24 so that when B asked the bank to
pay W W became a donee beneficiary of this contract. Third
party beneficiaries of contracts are either payment beneficiaries
16 Cockrane v. Moore, supra.
17 72 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 245, 375.
Is Notes 9-11 supra.
'9 Pound, Introduction to Philosophy of Law, 282.
20 (1866) 26 Ind. 199.
21 (1833) 4 Barn. & Adolf. 621.
22 Fitch v. Snedaker, (1863) 38 N. Y. 248; Williams v. West Chicago etc.
Co., (1901) 191 Il. 610; Taft et al. v. Hyatt et al., (1919) 105 Kan. 35.
23 72 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 391, 395-6, 398.
24 26 Col. Law Rev. 459.
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or donee beneficiaries. A large majority of the states of the
Union permit donee beneficiaries2s and almost all of them permit
payment beneficiaries2 6 to recover on contracts for their benefit;
and Indiana permits both to recover.27 In the instant case,
therefore, we simply had another illustration of another donee
beneficiary contract, and this would seem to have been a happy
solution of the case, but the Appellate Court did not refer to it.
Hence, if it should be agreed that the Indiana Appellate Court
reached the right result in the instant case, it would seem that
it ought to have done so either under the law of donee bene-
ficiary contracts, or the law of powers, rather than under the
law of gifts. 28
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS
Indiana University School of Law.
25 Williston on Contracts, § 368.
26 Williston on Contracts, § 381.
27 Boruff v, Hudson, (1894) 138 Ind. 280: Ransdel et al v. Moore et al.,
(1899) 153 Ind. 393, 405.
28 Of course if in this case B had put her promise in writing, a still
further explanation would have been available, that a written promise,
signed and delivered, is a contract. McCrillis v. Sutton et al., (1919) 207
Mich. 58; Sutch's Estate, (1902) 201 Pa. 305; Brickell v. Hendricks, (1920)
121 Miss. 356; Thomason et al. v. Bescher et al., (1918) 176 N. C. 622;
and some cases of gifts with so called symbolical delivery, like In re Cohn's
Will, (1919) 176 N. Y. S. 255; Hawkins v. Union Trust Co., (1919) 175
N. Y. S. 694; Goldworthy v. Johnson, (Nev. 1922) 204 Pac. 505; Humphrey
v. Ogden, (1912) 53 Colo. 309, should have been decided on this ground.
